Introduction: damage and excess
What exactly constitutes the transboundary damage caused by the failure to take effective action to avoid making climate change worse than it otherwise would be? The quoted observations by
Lefeber indicate that what will be considered damage under international law is relative to which causal contributions to climate change are judged to be excessive -damage and excess go together. Implicitly this invokes a picture of the climate situation that we do well to make explicit. The conceptual picture is constructed around two zones, respectively, of resignation and indulgence, the first planet-wide and the second country-specific. First, it is accepted that a certain amount of climate change beyond what has already happened is going to occur. Second, it has been accepted that every state may continue to contribute to a certain extent to further climate change in a manner that does not count as excessive, and is therefore not to be considered as a source of transboundary damage.
The former planet-wide zone of resignation is not entirely a product of the latter country-specific zones of indulgence and arises partly out of necessity, not policy. One part of the explanation of I shall argue that we must specify the planetary zone of resignation first on the basis of the seriousness of the damage at risk for everyone, and then must specify any national zones of indulgence accordingly, so that the chosen planetary zone of resignation is not exceeded through extravagant claims for national indulgence on the basis of out-moded notions of state sovereignty. The interpretation of international law should rest on a policy adopted toward acceptable risks of damage, especially severe damage to the defenceless.
Hence, before we reflect on the line-drawing issues raised by the specification of 'excess', we must grasp the kinds of damage that excess in this realm produces. The twinned causes, excessive degradation of sinks and excessive emissions, produce in combination twinned sets of effects.
First, of course, they directly cause the various interrelated phenomena that are referred to as climate change itself. These phenomena, singly and in multiple combinations, then yield multiple 
NCC, online at www.nature.com/nclimate/journal/vaop/ncurrent/full/nclimate1584.html (last accessed 5 June 2014). 3 See C. Hamilton, Earthmasters: The Dawn of the Age of Climate Engineering (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2012), at ix: '[f]or sheer audacity, no plan by humans exceeds the one now being hatched to take control of the Earth's climate. Yet it is audacity born of failure, a collective refusal to do what must be done to protect the Earth and ourselves from a future that promises to be nasty, brutish and hot.' 4 This is made more palatable if one assumes that adaptation can be successful in response to this degree of change. Human lives -and entire species of plants and animals -will, however, be lost. and the social infrastructure that has allowed the human population to explode several times over.
The agriculture at the base of this social pyramid is, however, strikingly fragile, and the weather cannot change beyond certain points without disruptions in the supply of food that would initially yield price fluctuations and subsequently produce scarcities, to neither of which the poorest humans would be able to adjust.
5 Any 'standard of tolerance' in this area deserves sharp scrutiny, as does any interpretation of state sovereignty that would grant license to undermine the very preconditions of the viability of the units claiming it. Any suggestion that state sovereignty ought to include license to engage in activities that risk undermining such fundamental conditions of life would be absurdly self-defeating. It is clearly vital that the customary prohibition on transboundary damage be considered jus cogens in the case of damage that risks undermining the essential physical underpinnings of human agriculture and the rest of the human economy.
Indeed, one might plausibly posit 'a primitive social contract at the international level whereby the international community, as a reified entity, owes a sort of sovereign duty to protect its subjects, in the same way that a state must protect its citizens against crime. In this sense, the duty is clearly a shared obligation and owed by the international community as a whole (...) and by all states constituting that community, irrespective of their special relationship to the injured state'. 6 As we shall see, this would have powerful implications for who could bring legal actions.
Cumulative carbon: the science
The second kind of damage produced by sink-destruction and emissions-production is quite different from the first set, and more profoundly socially mediated. The standard way of specifying the extent of what I am calling the planetary zone of resignation is to say that we will attempt to prevent an increase in average global temperature, compared to the average temperature prior to the Industrial Revolution, of more than two degrees Celsius (2°C), which of course means accepting a temperature rise of 2°C. In effect, a line is being drawn between two degrees of 'tolerable' worsening of the climate and further intolerable worsening. It is generally understood that the first two degrees of rise is far from unproblematic, but this is widely believed to be the most ambitious goal that might be politically feasible. The goal of 2°C informally adopted in Copenhagen and formally embraced in Cancun rests on drawing this line here.
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Leaving aside the question whether 2°C is the best place for the line, we must choose some number. We must specify how much climate change is too much, and thereby how much, and which kinds of, damage we accept (in trust for the future generations who will mostly be the ones who suffer it).
An impressive number of recent scientific analyses have converged on the suggestion that once a political decision has been reached about the amount of temperature rise that will be accepted, we single factor that predicts most accurately the most likely amount of temperature change beyond the pre-Industrial Revolution temperature is the cumulative amount of carbon emitted since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution -since, say, 1750. The total cumulative amount of carbon emissions since 1750 is what matters -rather than, say, the current annual global emissionsbecause of the extraordinarily long atmospheric residence time of carbon dioxide. Once carbon dioxide is injected into the atmosphere it remains for a lengthy period -for many molecules, the residence time in the stratosphere is millennia -so the atmospheric total continues to swell decade after decade. 9 The strong correlation between total cumulative carbon emitted since the Industrial Revolution began and rise in average global temperature since the Industrial Revolution began means that for any amount of temperature rise chosen as the political goal of efforts to deal with climate change, the atmospheric scientists can calculate the approximate cumulative carbon budget that makes it more likely than not that the temperature goal will not be exceeded. For a rise of no more than 2°C, for instance, the cumulative carbon budget is around one trillion tonnes. This budget is already more than half used up -emissions from 1750 to date are over 580 Gigatonnes -and if emissions continue on the trajectory of the last 20 years, the remainder of the budget will be exhausted in 26 years, in 2040. 
Cumulative carbon: the significance
For our purposes particular numbers are primarily illustrative. The significance lies in the basic logic: for any given total of cumulative carbon emissions -any given cumulative carbon budgetthere is a most likely temperature rise. As humanity exceeds that cumulative carbon budget, the probability of lower average global temperatures than the target falls, and the probability of higher temperatures rises.
So far, as the observation initially quoted from Lefeber indicates, we have tended to believe that for each state in the international system a national zone of indulgence could be specified in terms of permissible additional GHG emissions: '[a]n injured state can therefore only invoke the responsibility of states whose contributions to climate change exceed the standard of tolerance.'
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If we frame our challenge in terms of the global carbon budget, however, we begin to see that the current pattern of thinking nation-by-nation is highly problematic.
Above all, the cumulative carbon budget is global. Emissions must be summed not only over time since 1750 but over all nations. This reveals one of the dangers of thinking in terms of national zones of indulgence: it allows it to seem appropriate to do calculations from the bottomnational (or in the case of the European Union (EU), regional) -level up. But this is a mistaken procedure. It is the global total of emissions that must be restricted to the cumulative carbon budget for whichever goal of temperature rise has been chosen. There is no guarantee -indeed, no real prospect -that bottom-up allowances will sum to only the maximum global total compatible with the desired temperature rise. This would require some truly miraculous 'Invisible Hand'. Failure in the mitigation enterprise is certain unless the allowances for nations/regions are reached with a view to a global total that is fixed first on the basis of the temperature rise to which human agriculture and other human enterprises can successfully adapt rapidly enough. Emissions targets must be viewed from the top down -from the chosen global goal to the national/regional allowances that will in fact lead to that goal. This is by far the lesser stringency, however. The greater discipline lies in the fact that the remaining balance of 'allowable' emissions, whatever the appropriate total budget is, is rapidly diminishing through our currently undisciplined carbon emissions free-for-all. The point is not to 11 Lefeber, 'Climate Change and State Responsibility', n. 1, at 340, 346. 6 delay the day on which the trillionth tonne of carbon is emitted, but to keep that day from coming -ever. This is not a political constraint that can be fiddled -this is a feature of planetary dynamics.
Obviously, then, in order to avoid the infliction of the transboundary damages inherent in further climate change we need to specify national/regional emissions allowances, at least some of which decline so rapidly that total global cumulative carbon emissions into the atmosphere never reach one trillion tonnes, if we are serious about the goal of a temperature rise no greater than 2°C. In short, net injections of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere must reach zero before the atmospheric total reaches one trillion tonnes. Basically, we must promptly find an exit from the fossil-fuel/carbon regime that now dominates the planet and has brought us both industrial society and climate change.
Yet contemporary societies cannot function without massive supplies of energy. Exiting the carbon regime, then, requires entering a non-carbon regime. The transition to an alternative energy regime will require courageous leadership and great exertion because it will be constantly attacked by fossil-fuel interests, the value of whose capital assets -the proven reserves of coal, oil, and gas -will turn out to be a financial bubble if humanity acts against climate change.
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This is not the place to analyse alternative paths for the energy transition, and I have considered one strategy elsewhere. Compliance requires states to adopt, implement, supervise, and enforce policies and measures to achieve the objective, in this case policies and measures that prevent, limit, or reduce the emission of greenhouse gases, i.e. mitigation action.' 15 In sum, the first factor embodies the legal requirement of due diligence and is reasonable in common-sense terms as recognising good-faith effort.
Profligate emissions: four allocation principles
Second, a further factor is what kinds of costs the state would need to impose upon its own residents in order to do more to constrain carbon emissions than it is now doing. In effect, a high score on this consideration might function as a justification for a low score on the first. 16 It would not be reasonable to expect a state to make strenuous efforts to constrain its carbon emissions if, for example, many of its residents suffer from 'energy poverty' in, for instance, being unable to afford the electricity necessary for a decent life, and the only energy that could affordably be provided to those deprived residents is carbon-based energy.
If, by contrast, the state's residents have among the highest per capita rates of energy consumption in the world, they certainly can reasonably be asked to manage with less. Indeed, it is precisely for the sake of energy-deprived people who can potentially afford nothing other than carbon-based energy that energy-rich people must not unnecessarily exhaust the remaining carbon budget in a wasteful or frivolous manner. The cumulative carbon budget is after all strictly zero-sum: whatever the rich consume becomes unavailable for the deprived. 17 In short, the second factor embodies the legal excuse of necessity and is reasonable in common-sense terms as a form of fairness that acknowledges genuine needs.
The third factor to consider, then, is the current emissions per capita of the residents of the state in question, which are a direct measure of the extent of their ongoing appropriation of resources from the shrinking common pool. This objective measure should be qualified by the first two factors. If, in accord with the first, the state is making a maximum effort to restrict its emissions, then it is perhaps exercising due diligence even if the objective level of its members' appropriation is higher than ideal for now. Adequate effort makes up to some degree for inadequate results. Similarly, if, in accord with the second, the state could not restrict its emissions without depriving its residents of energy that they need for a decent life, it would be unreasonable to accuse it of transboundary damage even if its emissions were objectively higher than ideal. It is not fair to expect the sacrifice of the fulfilment of genuine needs.
If, by contrast, the state is neither doing its best to reduce emissions nor unable to reduce them without depriving its members of essentials, and its emissions per capita are high, this evidently indicates that its emissions are profligate, and it is inflicting both kinds of transboundary damage on the rest of the world. If emissions per capita are exceptionally high, this shows that the profligate emissions are produced in flagrant disregard of other peoples.
It may be objected to the third factor that the people of different states have different needs and so it is not reasonable to expect equal per capita emissions from everyone. The content of the objection is correct, but the objection is irrelevant. The third factor neither supposes that emissions ought to be the same per capita nor that it is somehow automatically wrong for one state's per capita emissions to be higher than another's. It assumes only that if a state's emissions are among the highest in the world, it bears the burden of explanation why they should be so high, given the urgency of reducing emissions overall. If the state is making great efforts to reduce emissions (first factor) or its weather is especially extreme (example of second factor), the higher emissions might be either excusable or justifiable.
Most important, the objection ignores the fundamental point that the cumulative carbon budget is The third reason in support of this fourth factor is this: since the cumulative carbon budget is a measure of a good held in common, namely the diminishing capacity to emit carbon without contributing to an intolerably great rise in temperature, the distribution of that increasingly scarce good among states and individuals is inherently a question of fairness, or as lawyers like to say, equity. And to deprive people of their fair share of a vital good is to damage them. Distributive issues are unavoidable here because a shared good must be divided. To try to deny that this distribution raises normative issues is implicitly to make the preposterous claim that a procedure under which the richest grab whatever they want until it is all gone is a normatively acceptable procedure for the division of such a valuable scarce good. The state's percentage of total cumulative emissions is the most obviously direct measure of the extent of its appropriation so far of this good held in common by the people of all states. This standard can be interpreted in a number of different ways -as we shall see below, it may be fairer to deduct from each nation's absolute total the emissions that were essential for the provision of basic necessities to its population, or to deduct the emissions before the effects of emissions were understood. But the basic contention that cumulative emissions indicate the share taken out of the commons seems difficult to deny.
So the four allocation principles that I am proposing should be considered in order to judge when a state's emissions are profligate are: first, extent of effort to reduce emissions ('due diligence'); second, costs of possible additional reductions ('necessity'); third, current emissions per capita (actual results to date); and fourth, percentage of total cumulative emissions (national encroachment on global budget). responsibility that is either less or greater than (the percentage of) that agent's causal contribution. As a general proposition, this is certainly true. One may not be morally responsible for some effects one has caused, and one may be morally responsible for some states of affairs that one has not caused. Unfortunately, in specifying how moral responsibility differs from causal responsibility considerable complication comes in. 30 The next two calculations consider two of them respectively.
The US case: causal and moral responsibility for profligacy
In both cases, Müller, Höhne, and Ellermann use what they call 'a (bottom-up) allowance-based methodology', which permits various allowances, based on various different factors relevant to responsibility, to be incorporated into the calculations in order to reflect facets of the difference between national causal responsibility and national moral responsibility:
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The idea is that allowances may be allocated to emitters, which they can use against their emissions in calculating their level of responsibility. It is, in general terms, analogous to the system of tax allowances used in most countries in differentiating the tax burden. There can be different kinds of such 'climate change responsibility allowances', depending on the (moral) justification for their allocation.
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Some allowances are applied per capita, and some are not; each allowance might be set at any of many different levels, and the level chosen needs to be justified morally. 33 This becomes highly complex and contentious, and I will mention only one per capita and one national allowance.
Secondly, then, one might think that every nation is entitled to a certain basic level of emissions and that it would be unfair to hold a nation responsible for using its initial 'basic allowance' of emissions. 34 This is analogous to the tax-free income at the bottom of many tax tables. Müller, Höhne, and Ellermann quite reasonably assign their basic allowance per capita. Obviously, all per capita quotas serve in fact, other things equal, to reduce the responsibility of the more populous 30 We are of course concerned with legal responsibility under international law, which they did not attempt to consider. But I believe their discussion still turns out to be instructive for our purposes, and I come to international legal responsibility in light of their analysis below. 31 Müller, Höhne and Ellermann, 'Differentiating (Historic) Responsibilities for Climate Change', n. 26, at 598; Ellermann, Höhne and Müller, 'Differentiating Historical Responsibilities for Climate Change', n. 26, at 77. 32 Ibid. 33 My own fear is that the moral complexity will make the allowance component of the methodology collapse of its own weight in a manner that is indeed precisely analogous to many national tax codes, which desperately need simplification. 34 
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The US moves even farther into the top spot.
Thirdly, just as one cannot be morally responsible for having engaged in basic activities everyone must engage in, it is also widely thought that one cannot be morally responsible for consequences that one neither intended nor even foresaw. 37 Thus, it might be thought that a nation whose Focusing exclusively on the United States and comparing the three measures, the US has a 'causal contribution share' of 19.7 per cent, a 'strict responsibility share' of 25.6 per cent, and a 'limited responsibility share ' (1990-2005 emissions only) of 20.1 per cent. Rather than plunge into the myriad issues concerning which, if any, of these three measures might be most appropriate for which purposes -presumably, different measures for different purposes -and at which level each of the two allowances should be set, I would like to suggest that two facts stand out starkly.
First, whichever of these three measures of cumulative emissions one uses, the US share is always the largest in the world; and second, for all the philosophical complexities attendant upon judgments about the relative merits of (these and other) alternative calculations of shares, the US never falls significantly below 20 per cent of the total for all nations on earth. This seems to me to be basically all that one needs to know. In sum, the US has made the largest -and absolutely a very substantial -contribution to the creation of climate change and consumed the largest portion of the cumulative carbon budget (factor four), while doing very little about it (factor one) with no plausible excuse (factor two) and continuing to this day to emit at one of the highest per capita rates in the world (factor three) -the third highest among industrial nations. (measure 3), which qualifies causal responsibility by ignoring all emissions prior to 1990 on epistemic grounds. 42 Knowledge or lack of knowledge would be relevant only if fault needed to be established, but 'in international law, liability does not depend on fault and is established on the basis of attribution and breach alone'. 43 As I have noted already, the US is in any case the worst offender by all three measures.
Their somewhat misleadingly named 'strict responsibility' (measure 2), which qualifies causal responsibility by applying a per capita 'allowance' for emissions necessary (given the existing energy regime) for a decent life, is presented by them as one reading of moral responsibility. I would suggest, however, that it is also the core of one reasonable way to try to quantify 'excess' emissions in the sense prohibited by international law. In my terminology it could be construed as already being a reading of the fourth factor (cumulative emissions) qualified by the second factor (necessity). I would simply suggest also considering the first factor (extent of due diligence) and the third factor (results to date) in assessing the wrongfulness of state behaviour.
The most contentious aspect of using their conception of 'strict responsibility' as a reading of responsibility under international law would, I imagine, be the setting of the specific level of the allowances, an issue that I have not pursued. Some people would, I suspect, consider the level at which Müller, Höhne, and Ellermann have set their allowances too low, that is, as interpreting 'necessity' too strictly. However, it is worth observing that since the allowance is per capita and the US population is far smaller than some other, poorer nations with growing emissions (notably, China and India), the higher the allowance is set, the worse the US looks. A possible challenge would be to find non-arbitrary bases for a particular level. Nevertheless, the suggestion that some per capita adjustment should be made to the absolute amount of emissions to reflect the fact that until we escape the fossil-fuel regime a certain amount of emissions are very temporarily unavoidable -and certainly were in the past -seems sound.
42 D. Weisbach analyses cumulative per capita emissions since 1990 only -see Weisbach, 'Negligence, Strict Liability, and Responsibility for Climate Change', n. 25, at 562, 
Conclusions
Fundamentally, the current situation is urgent precisely because so much of the cumulative carbon budget has already been used up. The single largest factor explaining why the global carbon allowance will be exhausted so soon is the percentage of the global sinks already filled by emissions from the United States: at least 19.7 per cent. The primary contributor to the exhaustion of the cumulative carbon budget is the US, whose total cumulative emissions remain to this day the largest in the world. US emissions are profligate, and flagrantly so. 44 I believe, therefore, that cases for transboundary damage ought to be brought against the US in international courts by some of the states that are, and will be, suffering the most from, for example, sea-level rise. 45 Further, if one accepts the suggestion mentioned earlier that the thickening of the web of international norms is moving the international situation closer to a 'primitive social contract', thus heightening the aspects of shared responsibility that are analogous to domestic public law, it is natural to conceive of the obligation not to undermine the fundamental pre-conditions of human life as an erga omnes obligation and to see enforcement action by any state, whether directly injured itself or not, 'essentially as a public prosecutor' acting on behalf of the most vulnerable segments of humanity. 46 Humanity cannot grant an individual state a permissive zone of indulgence allowing profligate emissions and hope to have a prayer of maintaining a manageable planetary zone of acceptance. It is incoherent to think otherwise, and current extreme US interpretations of sovereignty as permitting its current reckless behaviour are insupportable in the real world of scientific laws. 47 Flagrant actors like the US may continue to make staying customary international law by both injured states and other states acting in the global public interest to restore legality might be one useful tool.
